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Introduction
The quality of domestic institutions plays a key role in shaping a country's pattern of comparative advantage. Recent research has, in particular, identified two major institutional characteristics that matter for trade: i) the quality of contract enforcement as it affects the capability to specialize in relationship-specific industries (Nunn, 2007) ,
and ii) the development of the financial system, as credit constraints may prevent firms from investing in R&D or market entry costs, which in turn can negatively affect their export performance (Manova 2008; Antràs and Caballero 2009). Little is known, however, about how trade is affected by the interaction of those aspects.
We investigate the impact of equity market liberalizations in the period 1980-1997 on sectoral export performance across 91 countries. Our focus is on the differential impact of those liberalizations on industries with a varying degree of relationship-specificity.
Following the classification by Nunn (2007), we think of a "specific industry" as one where detailed contractual arrangements and unique investments of input suppliers and final goods producers are required, giving rise to hold-up and renegotiation issues. relationship-specific industries. Possible mechanisms can be that firms are reluctant to source from, or to invest in, financially weak countries as they anticipate opportunistic behavior of their partners who face financial frictions; or because non-standard inputs require higher upfront investments which are more difficult to finance in such countries.
The available evidence on the link between financial development and the relationshipspecificity of exports is mostly cross-sectional, however, which makes it difficult to establish a causal effect of finance.
Our contribution is to address those issues from a dynamic perspective, by exploiting the drastic changes in domestic financial systems that came with the equity market relationship-specificity contributes more than external finance dependence to the understanding of this sectoral variation.
Data
The main data set for this study is from Manova (2008). 1 It combines export flows for 27
(3-digit ISIC) industries and 91 countries over the period 1980-1997 with country-level data on financial liberalizations, and sector-level data on financial vulnerability.
The main variable capturing the event of liberalization is a dummy that is zero in all years before, and one in all years after the official equity market opening. 39 countries ii) asset tangibility, defined as the share of net property, plant and equipment in total book-value assets for the median US firm in that industry.
To this data set, we merge the 3-digit ISIC sector-level information derived from Nunn We also use three alternative measures, namely: ii) a similar dummy referring to the "first sign" of an upcoming liberalization, iii) an index that is zero before, and ranges between zero and one in all years after the official liberalization, where the index value captures the reform intensity, and iv) an analogous index for the "first sign" of liberalization. As further control variables we also use her country-level data on GDP and factor endowments. For all details about these data, see Manova (2008) . 3 The data are available under http://scholar.harvard.edu/nunn/pages/data-0. Below we also report several robustness checks related to this measure of relationship-specificity. 3 market and for which no international reference price exists. This index is available for all 27 sectors included in Manova (2008) . Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics and correlations between the sectoral variables used in our study. The data show that machinery or scientific equipment are among the most, and tobacco and non-ferrous metals are among the least specific industries. Furthermore, more specific industries tend to rely more on external finance, although there are also some exceptions (e.g., leather products), and they tend to have lower asset tangibility.
Estimation
We investigate the differential impact of financial liberalization on sectoral exports by estimating the following panel specification that is similar as in Manova (2008):  , i.e., the interaction with respect to asset tangibility. We consistently estimate a strongly positive and highly significant coefficient 1 0   . 5 That is, liberalization has disproportionally boosted exports of more relationship-specific industries.
Furthermore, we find that the interaction term 2  remains positive and significant (see column 3), although it becomes substantially smaller than in column 1. The interaction term 3  is not significant, however, once we control for relationship-specificity. These findings are important to set our results into perspective to Manova (2008).
First, we find that financial liberalization seems to generate winning and losing sectors.
Our results in column 3 imply that the export volume is predicted to rise after Table 1 , such a sector does not exist as Speci, and AssetTangi are always larger than zero in the data. 5 We also test for the joint significance of β0+β1. The last row reports the Wald Chi-Square test and the respective p-value. As can be seen, the two terms are also jointly significant. An alternative Wald test for the hypothesis β0=β1=0 yields very similar results.
5 ranging up to 123% in the Scientific equipment sector. Exports are negatively affected, however, in 7 cases with changes as large as -51% in the petroleum refineries. The impact of financial development on trade is therefore economically substantial and strongly heterogeneous across sectors. An intuition may be that the general increase in the availability of external capital in the economy induces tougher selection and reallocation of credit, so that some sectors even end up exporting less than before. The dependent variable is the log of exports to the world by 3-digit ISIC sector, 1980-1997. The official and first sign liberalization dummies and intensities, external finance dependence, and asset tangibility are defined as in Manova (2008). Relationship specificity is defined as in Nunn (2007) as the fraction of inputs neither bought nor sold on an exchange market nor reference priced, using the conservative classification by Rauch (1999). All sectoral variables have been centred around their respective mean. GDP is the log of the exporter's GDP. All regressions include a constant term, exporter, year and sector fixed effects, and cluster errors at the exporter level. Standard-errors reported in parentheses. ***, **, *, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Further comparing our results with Manova (2008), her main conclusion is supported by our analysis insofar, as we also find that the export volume tends to increase more in sectors with higher external finance dependence. However, our results suggest that the differential relationship-specificity across industries is considerably more important when it comes to explaining the sectoral variation in the effect of liberalization on trade.
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Robustness checks
Columns 5-7 of Table 2 show that our baseline results remain robust when using the "first sign of liberalization" dummy or the indicators of reform intensity instead of the official liberalization dummy. This is important, because a causal interpretation of the results requires that the equity market openings provide an exogenous shock to the availability of external capital, and do not capture other institutional changes that have occurred because countries anticipated future financial deregulations. Those concerns about possible anticipation effects are allayed. Second, in columns 5-8 we repeat the exercise, but now focus on those countries that actually liberalized their equity markets during the observation period. Thereby our coefficients are now only identified from such countries where export flows can be observed both before and after a financial deregulation. Our main results remain qualitatively unchanged when focusing on this subsample of "switchers", the only exception being in column 6.
TABLE 4 HERE
Third, in columns 9-12 we follow Manova's (2008) "event study" approach and use a fixed effect ci  for every country  industry pair instead of separate fixed effects c  and
(1). This setup takes into account that there may have been pair-specific unobserved differences driving export performance parallel to a liberalization event.
It is considerably more demanding than the specification in (1), since identification now purely comes from within-country changes in trade over time, thus attributing the key role to the time variation. The results show that, unlike 2  and 3  which now turn insignificant, our main coefficient 1 0   remains robust, column 10 being the only exception. The "event study" thus corroborates our earlier finding that financial liberalizations disproportionally boost exports of more specific industries, although the quantitative magnitudes are now somewhat smaller than before. 7 Finally, we have also conducted robustness checks with respect to Nunn's (2007) measure of relationship-specificity. In particular, for the share of inputs not sold on an exchange market, Rauch (1999) provides a "conservative" and a "liberal" definition.
Furthermore, he also suggests that the information on the reference prices may be omitted when computing the sectoral index of specificity, which is then only computed as the share of inputs not bought or sold on organized exchange market (in a 6 Factor endowments are not available in all cases. This is why the number of observations drops from 91 to 70 countries in columns 1-4, and why we cannot include all 39 but only 33 "switching" countries in columns 5-8. For the event study setup in columns 9-12, we return to the sample of 70 countries. 7 We have also reproduced Table 2 using pair-specific fixed effects ηci instead of ηc and ηi. Our main result remains: β1 > 0 robustly holds, and using these coefficients to build an analogue to Table 3 , our results still suggest that specificity adds more than finance dependence to the understanding how liberalization affects sectoral export volumes.
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"conservative" or a "liberal" definition). The results reported so far refer to the "conservative" definition, and use the information on the reference prices. As a robustness check, we have reproduced Table 4 , that is, when adding factor endowments as controls, when focusing only on the "switchers", or when conducting the "event study" analysis.
Conclusions
The longitudinal design of our study identifies the causal effect of financial liberalization The dependent variable is the log of exports to the world by 3-digit ISIC sector, 1980-1997. See Manova (2008) and legend to Table 2 for definitions. All sectoral variables have been centred around their respective mean. Regressions 1-8 include a constant term, country, year and industry fixed effects. Regressions 9-12 include a constant term, year fixed effects and fixed effects for country*industry pairs. In regressions 1-4 and 9-12 we include all 70 countries for which factor endowments data is available. In regressions 5-8 we include only those 33 out of 70 countries where the respective liberalization indicator changed from zero to a positive value during the observation period. Standard errors are clustered at the country level and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, *, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
